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Legal Negotiation and Communication




E-mail recently has become a popular mode of communication for lawyers ne-
gotiating deals and conducting settlement discussions. But the obvious conve-
niences of e-mail as a negotiation medium can blind users to its pitfalls. The
impoverished nature of the e-mail medium can lead to misunderstandings, sin-
ister attributions, and ultimately, negotiation impasse. How can lawyers make
use of the advantages of e-mail for negotiation while overcoming its disadvan-
tages? One solution consists of a very simple insurance measure: small talk. In
the empirical demonstration described in this Article, law students each negoti-
ated a commercial transaction with another law student at a different university
using e-mail as the mode of communication. Negotiators who engaged in a brief,
getting-to-know-you phone conversation built substantial rapport that resulted in
positive social and economic benefits for both parties. This initial small talk by
telephone made subsequent e-mail interaction proceed more smoothly because
the early creation of rapport helped the negotiators approach the negotiation with
a more cooperative mental model, thereby trusting in each other’s good inten-
tions. This, in turn, led to a successful negotiation that concluded with a contract,
and engendered positive feelings about one another and expectations of success-
ful dealings in the future. By contrast, negotiators who did not engage in small
talk were over four times more likely to reach an impasse, and ended up feeling
resentful and angry about the negotiation. The Article concludes by discussing
implications and recommendations for lawyers who use e-mail to negotiate.
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E-mail recently has become a popular mode of communication for lawyers 
negotiating deals and conducting settlement discussions. But the obvious 
conveniences of e-mail  as a negotiation medium can blind users to its pitfalls. 
The impoverished nature of the e-mail medium can lead to misunderstandings, 
sinister attributions, and ultimately, negotiation impasse.  How can lawyers 
make use of the advantages of e-mail for negotiation while overcoming its 
disadvantages?  One solution consists of a very simple insurance measure: 
small talk.  In the empirical demonstration described in this Article, law 
students each negotiated a commercial transaction with another law student at 
a different university using e-mail as the mode of communication.  Negotiators 
who engaged in a brief, getting-to-knowByou phone conversation built 
substantial rapport that resulted in positive social and economic benefits for 
both parties.  This initial small talk by telephone made subsequent e-mail 
interaction proceed more smoothly because the early creation of rapport helped 
the negotiators approach the negotiation with a more cooperative mental 
model, thereby trusting in each other=s good intentions. This, in turn, led to a 
successful negotiation that concluded with a contract, and engendered positive 
feelings about one another and expectations of successful dealings in the future. 
 By contrast, negotiators who did not engage in small talk were over four times 
more likely to reach an impasse, and ended up feeling resentful and angry 
about the negotiation. The Article concludes by discussing implications and 
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Would an Oral or written communication be best? 






When George Washington sought James Madison=s advice about 
the best mode of communication to use when negotiating with the 
Senate, his array of options was quite limited by today=s standards.  Yet 
the import of  Washington=s query has grown over time, because we now 
have a larger number of communication options available.  E-mail, in 
particular, is a dominant mode of communication for lawyers who are 
negotiating deals and settlements.2  But  here is growing concern that 
there are potential pitfalls associated with the use of e-mail for 
important communications like negotiations. Until now, these concerns 
have focused on issues such as confidentiality,3 privacy,4 and lack of 
formality.5 This Article highlights and discusses a very different issue 
regarding he widespread use of e-mail in negotiations: the possibility 
that the use of e-mail compromises the quality of agreements 
themselves. 
                                            
1 Letter from George Washington to James Madison, August 5, 1789, quoted in Adam 
Nagourney, My Dear Sir: Letters by a Reluctant Commander, N.Y. Times, December 1, 
1999, at E1.  Nagourney reports that Washington was seeking Madison=s advice 
regarding the Constitutional provision that A[the President] shall have power, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the 
Senators present concur...@  U.S. Const., Art. II, Sec. 2.  Washington sought to make a 
treaty with the southern Creek Indians, but needed the advice and consent of the Senate 
to do so.  Washington=s query to Madison, therefore, sought Madison=s opinion on the 
best mode of communication for Washington to use in his negotiations with the Senate. 
2 E.g. Daniel C. Eidsmoe, On-Line Dispute Resolution, in Alternative Dispute 
Resolution ' 30.4 (Ill. Inst. for Continuing Legal Educ. 2001).   This handbook was 
specifically designed to instruct practicing lawyers on on-line dispute resolution, 
signaling the legal profession=s increasing use of the Internet as a medium for 
negotiation.   
3 See, e.g., RONALD D. ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS B THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 2002-2003 Ed., ' 7-2.4 Inadvertent Disclosure (ethics 
opinions regarding lawyers= use of unencrypted e-mail to communicate with clients are 
split, although most opinions have concluded that use of e-mail does not waive the 
attorney-client privilege). 
4 See Leonard T. Nuara et al., How the Internet Applies to Your Practice, 685 
PRACTICING LAW INST. PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY 
PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 7, 43-44 (2001) (advising lawyers of the privacy 
concerns raised by transmitting sensitive client information via e-mail) 
5 See William F. Swiggart, Enemy by E-Mail, BUSINESS LAW TODAY, May/June 2002 at 
32, 34 (arguing that problems arise when Aparties allow a lack of formality encouraged 
by the immediacy of e-mail to blur the distinctions among the roles of client, lawyer, 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art30
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This Article reports findings from an empirical study that 
addressed the question of whether the use of e-mail can hinder 
negotiators= ability to craft mutually-beneficial negotiated agreements. 
Based on these findings, I argue that there is indeed reason for worry 
when lawyers B especially lawyers who have not worked together in the 
past B use e-mail to try to close an important deal or settle a contentious 
dispute.  As I discuss in detail below, the absence of social cues in e-mail 
communication can lead to unwarranted suspicion, blame, and 
ultimately, negotiation impasse. Does this mean that lawyers should 
avoid e-mail at all costs when engaging in negotiations?  In this Article, I 
demonstrate empirically that there is a simple way to avert the 
escalation of negative emotion, miscommunication, and ultimately, 
impasse that can characterize e-mail negotiations.  Indeed, the study 
discussed here confirms what every Persian rug merchant knows when 
he insists that his customer sit down for a cup of tea prior to talking 
business: engaging in small talk prior to negotiating can set the stage for 
an atmosphere of trust and communication that can ultimately create 
value for both parties in the negotiation.  This Article begins by 
discussing research regarding how e-mail and face-to-face 
communication differ, highlighting various advantages and 
disadvantages of e-mail.  I then discuss the role of rapport in 
negotiation.  I argue that because negotiation often involves 
interpersonal conflict, rapport between negotiators acts as a social 
tranquilizer, preventing negotiators from becoming agitated.  Next, I 
report the results of an empirical study, which tested whether a rapport-
enhancing intervention could alleviate the miscommunication and social 
friction associated with e-mail.  I conclude by discussing implications of 
the research and recommendations for lawyers who use e-mail to 
negotiate. 
 
I. E-MAIL V. FACE-TO-FACE COMMUNICATION 
E-mail is now an integral part of law practice. Legal news sources 
regularly publish columns advising lawyers on how most effectively to 
use e-mail, as well as warning of various pitfalls in e-mail 
communication.6 Indeed, a single e-mail message written by an in-house 
Arthur Anderson attorney reportedly was the basis for the criminal 
liability of the company for obstruction of justice in the Enron 
investigation.7 Despite these potential drawbacks, at least one 
                                                                                                                
opposing party and opposing counsel). 
6 See, e.g., Jay Sullivan, Lawyers and Technology: A Crash Course in Writing Effective 
E-Mails, 229 N.Y.L.J. 5 (Feb. 4, 2003)(describing lawyers= Alove-hate@ relationship with 
e-mail); Frederick Hertz, Don=t Let Your Case Get Lost in the E-Mail, Legal Times, 20 
(Aug. 19, 2002)(warning that e-mails between lawyer and client can fall into the hands 
of opposing counsel); William F. Swiggart, supra note 5. 
7 Tom Fowler, Lawyers Fear Legal Impact of Anderson, Houston Chronicle 1 (June 25, 
2002). Anderson in-house counsel wrote an e-mail message to an Anderson partner 
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commentator has asserted that e-mail is now the Adominant mode of 
communication@ for lawyers.8 Some pro bono organizations view e-mail 
as an important new tool to encourage lawyers to perform pro bono 
work.9 Courts have begun to send notices and orders to attorneys via e-
mail, instead of U.S. mail.10 There is a growing body of case law 
regarding the legal status of e-mail messages in the statute of frauds,11 
the role of e-mail communications in establishing personal 
jurisdiction,12 and whether e-mail communications between lawyers in a 
single firm are considered published material for the purpose of stating a 
claim for libel.13 On-line mediation is becoming an increasingly common 
method for resolution of disputes that arise in e-commerce.14  The 
prevalence of e-mail in legal practice is in some sense predictable, given 
its clear advantages: the ability to use e-mail to communicate with 
                                                                                                                
advising her client about how to word an internal memo regarding the Enron 
investigation. It is tempting to speculate about the fate of Arthur Anderson had the in-
house attorney decided to pick up the telephone rather than memorializing her advice 
in an e-mail message. 
8 Frederick Hertz, Don=t Let Your Case Get Lost in the E-Mail, supra note 6. 
9 William J. Dean, Pro Bono Net: Technology and Sharing Ideas, Materials, Strategies, 
228 N.Y.L.J. 3 (Nov. 4, 2002)(describing how e-mail helps to coordinate distribution of 
pro bono cases to volunteer attorneys). 
10 See Charles Toutant, U.S. Court to Start Faxing Notices; Next Step Is Electronic Case 
Filing, 170 N.J.L.J. 833 (Dec. 9, 2002) 
11See, e.g., Shattuck v. Klotzbach, No. 011109A, 2001 WL 1839720 (Mass. Super. Dec. 
11, 2001) (holding that the typed name at the end of an e-mail message is indicative of 
the party=s intent to authenticate, and e-mail messages are thus capable of satisfying the 
statute of frauds). 
12 See Expert Pages v.  Buckalew, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)(A "the long-
arm of the Internet reaches  from California to New York. . . . [T]he use of electronic 
mail and the telephone . . . may establish sufficient minimum contacts" for purposes of 
establishing personal jurisdiction); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th 
Cir. 1996)(defendant=s e-mailed threats to seek an injunction constituted sufficient 
contacts with the state for establishing personal jurisdiction).  See, generally, David D. 
Tyler, Personal Jurisdiction via E-mail: Has Personal Jurisdiction Changed in the 
Wake of Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson?, 51 ARK. L. REV. 429 (1998).   
13 See Julia D. Gray, E-Mail=s No Conduit for Libel, Firm Says, 10 Fulton County Daily 
Rpt 1 (Oct. 29, 2002) 
14 See Ethan Katsh and Janet  Rifkin,Online Dispute Resolution (2001); Janice Nadler, 
Electronically-Mediated Dispute Resolution and E-Commerce, 17 NEGOTIATION J. 333, 
346 (2001) (discussing various dispute resolution systems that operate in cyberspace, 
such as Squaretrade (partnered with eBay), ClickNsettle.com (insurance claims), 
Cybersettle.com (insurance claims), Mediate-net (family law), and Internet Neutral 
(commercial contracts)); see also Daniel Eidsmoe, supra, note 2; Lucille M. Ponte, 
Throwing Bad Money After Bad: Can Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) Really Deliver 
the Goods for the Unhappy Internet Shopper? 3 TULANE J. TECH. & INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
55 (2001); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Robin M Kennedy & Jon Michael Gibbs, Cyber-
Mediation: Computer-Mediated Communications Medium Massaging the Message, 
32 N. MEXICO L. REV. 27 (2002). 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art30
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clients, co-counsel, opposing counsel, and even colleagues within the 
same office eliminates the need for people with hectic schedules to 
coordinate a time and place to meet or to coordinate a time to speak on 
the phone. 
The benefits of e-mail for lawyers are especially evident in 
negotiation. Whereas in the past lawyers were forced to arrange a series 
of face-to-face meetings with opposing counsel to conduct settlement 
discussions or to discuss the terms of a deal, the availability of 
communication technology such as e-mail allows lawyers to negotiate 
Aon the fly@ without the need to set aside special days and times to talk 
with other lawyers involved in the deal or dispute. Because many 
negotiations between lawyers take place over a period of days, weeks, or 
months, e-mail affords an advantage of allowing each negotiator to reply 
to proposals at his or her own convenience, rather than coordinating 
availability with the counterpart. 
Beyond convenience, e-mail affords certain strategic advantages. 
The lag time inherent in e-mail enables negotiators to take time to plan 
their next negotiating move, and to carefully craft their communications 
before sending them.  E-mail also has the capacity to transmit complex, 
precise, quantitative information, which can be crucial in complex 
negotiations. Studies of electronically mediated negotiations report that 
e-mail discussions generate more complex, integrative proposals, 
compared to face-to-face negotitations.15 
To create an agreement that efficiently captures value for both 
parties, there must be sufficient exchange of information to identify 
potential tradeoffs among the available issues.16  Exchanging offers 
involving many issues has proven to be a more effective method for 
generating integrative agreements, compared to resolving issues one-by-
one. The ability to transmit complex offers and integrative proposals is 
especially important in the context of transactional negotiations, in 
which the issues often are numerous and intricate.  Despite the 
importance of discussing issues simultaneously, face-to-face 
negotiations tend to progress on an issue-by-issue basis17 due to the 
limited "baud rate@ of face-to-face conversation and conversational 
norms of brevity.18 In contrast, e-mail negotiators can and do make 
complex offers involving packages containing multiple issues.19 E-mail 
communications offer negotiators a chance to convey complex messages 
without the threat of being interrupted midway through or the need to 
squeeze one=s message into the cadence of the conversation. 
                                            
15 See Michael Morris, Janice Nadler, Terri Kurtzberg, & Leigh Thomspon, Schmooze or 
Lose: Social Friction and Lubrication in E-mail Negotiations, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 
89 (2002). 
16 See HOWARD RAIFFA,  THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982). 
17 Morris et al, supra note 15. 
18 HERBERT  P. GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989). 
19 See Morris, et al., supra note 15. 
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At the same time, however, as a form of communication, e-mail is 
replete with hazards.  Statements made in e-mails often come across as 
abrasive or negative simply because they are not embedded in the shared 
context that face-to-face communicators experience.20  Face-to-face 
contact contributes to smooth communications because, although 
seldom consciously recognized, people rely heavily on nonverbal signals 
to help them conduct social interactions. Important behavioral, 
cognitive, and emotional processes are set into motion when people 
interact in person. Face-to-face negotiation allows people to develop 
rapport -- the feeling of being Ain sync@ or Aon the same wavelength@ with 
another person. 
In negotiation, rapport is a powerful determinant of whether 
people develop the trust necessary to engage in the kind of information 
exchange needed to reach integrative agreements.21  Nonverbal (body 
orientation, gestures, eye contact, head nodding) and paraverbal (speech 
fluency, the use of Auh-huhs,@ etc.) behaviors are key to building 
rapport.22  When the person with whom we are negotiating sits at a 
greater distance, with an indirect body orientation, backward lean, 
crossed arms, and little eye contact, we feel less rapport than when the 
same person sits with a forward lean, an open body posture, and 
maintains steady eye contact. Without realizing it, people involved in 
face-to-face interaction tend to mirror one another in posture, facial 
expression, tone of voice, and mannerisms.  This phenomenon, known 
as social contagion, is the basis for the development of rapport between 
people.23  On the surface, it might seem that mimicking would otherwise 
be extremely annoying B almost like a form of mockery.  The type of 
mimicry that is involved in everyday social encounters, however, is quite 
subtle B people do not usually recognize when it is happening.  At the 
same time, the effects of social contagion are very powerful.  When two 
people are mirroring one another, their movements become a 
choreographed dance.  To the extent that our behaviors are 
                                            
20 See Sproull & Keisler, supra note 8. On the other hand, some commentators have 
posited that e-mail communication has the benefit of reducing the feasibility of 
counter-productive posturing in negotiation, such as feigned anger or boredom, or 
storming out of the room.  See,  e.g., Lynn A. Epstein, Cyber E-Mail Negotiation vs. 
Traditional Negotiation: Will Cyber Technology Supplant Traditional Means of 
Settling Litigation?, 36 TULSA L.J. 839, 842 (2001).   
21 See Morris et al., supra note 15. 
22 See Jon E. Grahe & Frank J. Bernieri, The Importance of Nonverbal Cues in Judging 
Rapport, 23 J. NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR, 253 (1999). 
23 See Aimee L. Drolet & Michael W. Morris, Rapport in Conflict Resolution: 
Accounting for How Nonverbal Exchange Fosters Cooperation on Mutually Beneficial 
Settlements to Mixed-Motive Conflicts, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 26 
(2000). 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art30
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synchronized with those of others, we feel more rapport, and this 
increases our trust in those with whom we communicate. 
As a communication mode, e-mail effectively silences the music 
that drives the social contagion dance. E-mail negotiators are deprived 
of cues from the other person=s body language (e.g., AShe is frowning, so 
I know she doesn=t like my offer@), as well as cues from the other 
person=s voice (e.g., AHe is laughing so that remark was clearly meant 
sarcastically@).  Other social cues that we routinely use in face-to-face 
communication but are missing from e-mail communication include 
tone of voice, facial expression, head nodding, and mimicry of facial, 
vocal and postural movements.  In a bargaining context, the 
impoverished nature of the e-mail medium makes it difficult to establish 
a feeling of interpersonal connection with the other person, which in 
turn can lead to misunderstandings, sinister attributions, and 
ultimately, negotiation impasse.24 
 
II. THE ROLE OF RECIPROCITY IN NEGOTIATION 
The choice of communication medium is largely a contextual one: 
e-mail is better suited to some negotiations than others.  Negotiations 
between people who already know one another might be particularly 
well-suited for e-mail.  When people know each other they tend to be 
more cooperative generally and in negotiations specifically.25  For 
example, in the context of legal settlement negotiations, Johnston and 
Waldfogel examined whether the existence of a prior relationship 
between opposing counsel would affect the likelihood of settlement in 
civil lawsuits.26  After examining thousands of cases, they found that 
cases were resolved more quickly and were less likely to go to trial when 
opposing counsel had faced each other in the past, than when the 
ttorneys did not know each other.27 The authors concluded that when 
attorneys have repeated interactions, they learn how to communicate 
accurately with one another, which promotes the sharing of crucial 
information.28 The elimination of information asymmetries allows 
attorneys who know each other to converge on a settlement that is 
perceived as acceptable to both sides. 
The Johnston and Waldfogel study does not resolve the question 
of why attorneys who have faced one another in the past would be more 
                                            
24 See Morris et al., supra note 15. 
25See generally ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 136-70 
(3d ed. 1993) (we are more likely to grant requests to others whom we like); George F. 
Loewenstein et al., Social Utility and Decision Making in Interpersonal Contexts, 57 J. 
PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 426, 432-33 (1989)(when negotiators like one another, they 
prefer that the other person receive an equal share of the bargaining surplus).  
26 Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation? 
Evidence From Federal Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (2002). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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willing to share private information, especially in light of the adversarial 
context of their prior interactions. Instead of cooperatively sharing 
information, we might predict instead that frequent adversaries would 
become even more adversarial over time, leading them to hide 
information. One explanation Johnston & Waldfogel=s findings is the 
power of reciprocity. The idea that reciprocity flows from relationships B 
even adversarial relationships -- is an important one for understanding 
e-mail negotiation dynamics, where social cues are scarce and rapport is 
difficult to establish.  In Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam argues that 
social networks have value because they incline people to engage in 
reciprocity, or mutual aid.29  For example, talking to other parents 
involved in a youth soccer league can lead to the learning of valuable 
information, such as the existence of a job opening or a proposal before 
the city council regarding historic preservation.  Neighbors who talk to 
each other engage in mutually beneficial arrangements such as keeping 
an eye on each others= houses or trading dog-sitting duties.  Gem traders 
who are part of a tight social network are able to trade diamonds without 
incurring transaction costs such as testing purity.30 Relationships among 
members of social networks (variously defined) create opportunities for 
information exchange, reciprocity, and cooperation.  These 
opportunities are quite apart from the nature of the relationships in the 
networks.  As Putnam points out, it is not necessary that the people in 
these networks be friends or even like one another.  The important point 
is that people are connected. 
The reciprocity that flows from relationships helps to explain 
Johnston & Waldfogel=s findings that lawyers who frequently face one 
another are better at settling cases together than lawyers who are 
complete strangers. In the context of negotiation, interacting with 
someone who is within a social network to which you belong might has 
potential advantages over negotiating with a complete stranger.31 There 
is an expectation of reciprocity present within a social network that is 
not present when interacting with someone outside our network.32  One 
obvious reason is that often we care more about people within the 
network B in a social network where people are friendly each person is 
concerned about about the well-being of other members of the network 
in addition to their own well-being.33  Concern for the other, however, 
                                            
29 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000). 
30
 Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in 
the Diamond Industry, 21 Journal of Legal Studies 115 (1992).  
31 See Loewenstein, et al., supra, note 25. 
32 See Putnam, supra, note 29. 
33 See Loewenstein, et al., supra, note 25. 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art30
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seems an unlikely explanation for why the adversaries in Johnston & 
Waldfogel=s study were more successful negotiators. Fortunately, 
friendliness and liking are not necessary for developing reciprocity 
expectations. Quite apart from altruistic concerns, sharing a social 
network improves the flow of information.34  Achieving information flow 
in negotiation is a key step in finding the right combination of issues, 
and options within those issues, to achieve an outcome that is profitable 
for both sides.35  In the absence of information flow, negotiators are 
likely to fail to capture the entire cooperative surplus available.36  
Information flow allows negotiators to put a set of options on the table 
that maximizes the joint value of the agreement.37 
Information flow in negotiation is rarely easy to establish, owing 
to what has been called the Anegotiators= dilemma.@38  If you share too 
much private information, or the wrong kind of information, the other 
negotiator can take advantage by claiming virtually the entire surplus, 
and leaving you with the prospect of an agreement that is only slightly 
better than no agreement at all.  To be cautious and to make sure the 
other party does not take an unfair advantage, a negotiator must hold 
her cards close to her vest.39  But if both parties play it Asafe@ in this 
manner then information does not flow, surplus is not captured, the 
options on the table remain unsatisfying, and the result is 
 either no agreement or a low quality agreement.40  Revealing to the 
other party one=s own preferences and priorities allows profitable 
tradeoffs to be made.41 
                                            
34 See Putnam, supra, note 29. 
35 See Thompson, supra, note 23. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: 
BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN (1986).  
39 In addition, lawyers are also torn between the competing interests of establishing a 
reputation as a tough bargainer (and impressing their clients) while trying to develop 
beneficial relationships with professionals in their field.  E.g., Gary Mendelsohn, 
Lawyers as Negotiators, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 139 141-43, 154 (1996). Similarly, 
concern regarding informational inequality also poses a dilemma in the litigation 
discovery process.  See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through 
Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
509, 516 (1994) (asserting that one party=s cooperative approach to discovery can lead 
to exploitation by the other party).    
40 Id. at 780 (challenging the assumption that negotiators should hide information 
because that approach may foreclose better outcomes); see also Russell Korobkin, A 
Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1806 (2000) (arguing that 
withholding information increases transaction costs by lengthening the negotiations 
and raises the risk of impasse by giving the impression that there is no bargaining zone 
within which the parties can reach agreement); Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations 
Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 235, 241 (1993) (noting that the increased costs of adversarial behavior shrinks 
the size of the pie that the parties have to divide between themselves). Menkel-Meadow 
proposes that competitive behavior arises in legal negotiation because it takes place Ain 
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Knowing the other person (even just a little) with whom one is 
about to negotiate can help both parties feel more comfortable with the 
kind of information exchange that is necessary for an agreement.42  
Knowing the other person increases feelings of accountability and 
reciprocity, even if the acquaintance is extremely minimal.  For example, 
social psychologists Bibb Latane and John Darley tested the idea that a 
person who has brief verbal contact with another person is more likely to 
later help when he overhears that person having a seizure.43  They set up 
a situation in the laboratory where the experimental subject interacted 
briefly with another Asubject@ (actually a confederate) for less than one 
minute B engaging in small talk while waiting to participate in the 
experiment.  The subject was under the impression that five other 
subjects were participating in separate rooms, connected by an intercom 
system.  During the experiment, the subject overhears on the intercom 
another Asubject@ (actually the confederate) having a seizure in another 
room.  Subjects who engaged in one minute of small talk with the seizure 
victim prior to the experiment responded twice as quickly and were 
twice as likely to respond as subjects who had not engaged in small talk.  
The precise reasons for this striking difference are not entirely clear. 
Latane and Darley hypothesized that that subjects who met the victim 
(even though it was just through small talk) felt more accountable to the 
victim.44  The connection that is established between people who engage 
in brief small talk may be the spark that initiates expectations of 
reciprocity. 
Extending this finding to the e-mail negotiation context, we 
would expect that engaging in a brief, getting-to-know you chat prior to 
conducting e-mail negotiations would generate better information flow 
(as demonstrated by Johnston & Waldfogel) and greater expectations of 
reciprocity (as suggested by Darley & Latane), and as a result, perhaps a 
greater likelihood of reaching a negotiated agreement, than negotiators 
who do not engage in prior small talk.  At the same time, this 
                                                                                                                
the shadow of the courts,@ and thus negotiators tailor their negotiation to the litigation 
model and their solutions to those that a court could award.  See Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem 
Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 789-92 (1984).   
41 ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING 9 (2000). 
42 Indeed, studies of business students negotiating via e-mail have found that 
negotiators exchange more information and are more likely to reach agreement when 
they have taken steps to get acquainted.  See Don A. Moore et al., Long and Short 
Routes to Success in Electronically-Mediated Negotiations: Group Affiliations and 
Good Vibrations, 77 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 22 
(1999); Morris, et al., supra note 15. 
43 JOHN M. DARLEY & BIBB LATANE, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER: WHY DOESN=T HE 
HELP? 107 (1970) 
44 Id. at 107-09. 
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hypothesized result is at odds with the predictions of rational choice 
theorists, who would predict that negotiators= outcomes would not differ 
on the basis of polite chit-chat prior to negotiating.  After all, the parties= 
respective reservation prices and the value to each party of the issues 
involved in the negotiation could not possibly change based on a 
conversation that has nothing whatsoever to do with the negotiation. 
But rational choice theory does not always form the basis for 
accurate predictions about human behavior. Indeed, from a rational 
choice perspective, one would also predict the non-influence of a host of 
other factors that, in fact, have been demonstrated to influence the 
economic outcomes of negotiation.  For example, from the perspective of 
rational choice, a negotiator=s aspiration level should not have any effect 
on the value of the outcome to that negotiator.  Yet in fact higher 
aspiration levels do lead to negotiated outcomes that are more favorable 
to the party with high aspirations.45  In addition, from a rational choice 
perspective we would predict that revealing one=s own reservation price 
would result in a worse economic outcome for oneself, because the 
opponent would offer just slightly more than that amount, and the offer 
would be accepted.  Yet, in fact quite the opposite occurs -- when 
negotiators truthfully (and verifiably) revealed their alternative 
(information strongly suggestive of reservation price) in a purely 
distributive negotiation, their opponents gave in more quickly and 
conceded more than when negotiators did not reveal their alternative. 
Paradoxically, revealing one=s own alternative resulted in negotiated 
outcomes more favorable to oneself than when negotiators did not reveal 
their alternative.46  This result occurs because revealing information can 
trigger feelings of obligation to be cooperative, resulting in a better deal 
for the disclosing party.47  In other words, revealing information is 
                                            
45 See Sally B. White & Margaret A. Neale, The Role of Negotiator Aspirations and 
Settlement Expectancies in Bargaining Outcomes, 57 Organizational Behavior & 
Human Decision Processes 303 (1994). See also, Adam D. Galinsky, Thomas 
Mussweiler & Victoria H. Medvec, Disconnecting Negotiated Outcomes and 
Evaluations: The Role of Negotiator Focus (2003) (unpublished manuscript);   Russell 
Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 1 (2002).  
46 Paul W. Paese et al., Caught Telling the Truth: Effects of Honesty and 
Communication Media in Distributive Negotiation, paper presented at the 
International Ass=n of Conflict Mgmt 15th Ann. Conf., Park City, Utah (2002) (paper on 
file with author) 
47 Id. at 21.  The behavioral norm of reciprocity commonly emerges in negotiation.  A 
negotiator will make a concession expecting to receive one in return.  Failure to follow 
the behavioral norm of offering a concession after having just received one increases 
the likelihood of impasse.  See Sally Blount White & Margaret A. Neale, The Role of 
Negotiator Aspirations and Settlement Expectancies in Bargaining Outcomes, 57 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 303, 313-14 (1994) 
(finding impasses occurred more often when one negotiator had to make larger 
concessions than the other negotiator in order to reach a deal).  See also Jonathan R. 
Cohen, When People are the Means: Negotiating with Respect, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 739, 747, 761 (2001) (advocating respectful treatment in negotiation to create 
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perceived as an act of good faith, and leads to trust. The trusting party 
then makes a less extreme demand then she would have in the absence 
of good faith, leading to a better economic outcome for the disclosing 
party.48  Even more relevant for our purposes, this study found that trust 
was especially important for negotiation via e-mail, compared to face-to-
face negotiation,49 perhaps because trust levels are relatively low in e-
mail negotiation in the first place. 
To test the idea that in legal e-mail negotiations, substantial 
rapport can be built through a quick, simple chat, resulting in positive 
economic and social benefits, I designed and conducted an experiment, 
which I discuss in detail below. In the experiment, law students who 
were strangers to one another engaged in a negotiation exercise via e-
mail involving the purchase of a new car. Members of half of the 
negotiation dyads engaged in small talk via telephone prior to beginning 
negotiations via e-mail.  The remaining participants negotiated entirely 
via e-mail.  Because of the absence of non-verbal and paraverbal cues in 
email communication, rapport is difficult to establish and maintain in 
the absence of an intervention. I hypothesized that the telephone small 
talk intervention introduced in this experiment would encourage 
negotiators to establish a small degree of rapport at the outset, and to 
encourage the reciprocity necessary for information exchange and a 
higher likelihood of negotiated agreement. 
 




The negotiation exercise used in the experiment involved 
the purchase of a new car.  Participants consisted of 146 law students, 
half of whom were students at Northwestern University School of Law 
and half of whom were students at Duke Law School.  The students 
participated as part of a class assignment in a Negotiation course.  
Thirty-five randomly selected Northwestern students were paired with 
thirty-five randomly selected Duke students and were assigned to the 
                                                                                                                
feelings of indebtedness and encourage cooperation).  Unfortunately, negotiators who 
view negotiation as a zero-sum game will likely view these concessions as losses and 
choose not to engage in such reciprocity.  See Mendelsohn, supra note 33, at 147.  In 
reality, true zero-sum games are quite rare since generally multiple issues will be in 
dispute and parties will value each issue differently, leaving room for trade-offs to be 
made.  See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 38, at 784-85.     
48 Paese, et al., supra note 46.  In more precise social psychological terms, trust 
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ASmall Talk@ condition.  The remaining thirty-seven Northwestern 
students were randomly paired with the remaining thirty-seven Duke 
students and were assigned to the No Small Talk control condition. 
Participants were given confidential role instructions which 
specified that they were to conduct a two-party negotiation exclusively 
via electronic mail.  Each student received a packet of materials that 
contained a page of general confidential instructions and guidelines, an 
e-mail address for the opponent, and pre- and post- negotiation 
questionnaires.  Participants were given one week to complete the 
negotiation and questionnaires, and were specifically instructed to not 
discuss the negotiation or procedures with their classmates. 
Unbeknownst to participants in the No Small Talk control 
condition, the participants in the Small Talk condition received an 
additional special instruction:  they were to have an initial Agetting to 
know you@ telephone conversation lasting five to ten minutes with their 
partner before they began negotiating.50 Directions specified that 
participants should not talk about business (i.e., the negotiation) in this 
initial conversation, ensuring that it was a strictly social conversation.51  
The goal was to have negotiators Abreak the ice.@  Regardless of group 
assignment, all negotiations took place exclusively via e-mail. 
The negotiation itself involved the purchase of a new company car 
by a manager at a software company.  The negotiation contained both 
distributive and integrative elements.  Whereas both parties were 
motivated to claim as much value for themselves as possible, parties had 
different priorities; hence concessions by Party A on a given issue could 
be traded for gains on another issue which Party A values more but Party 
B values less.  This type of logrolling increases the joint value of the 
agreement, creating more profit that can be allocated between the two 
parties. 
The parties= priorities were quantified in payoff schedules 
provided in the exercise and are reproduced in the Appendix.  The 
Pareto-optimal agreement (one that yields the maximum joint outcome) 
yielded 30,000 points jointly.52 If negotiators failed to integrate their 
interests, and also did not realize their compatible interests, they divided 
a total of 21,600 points.  There are many other possible solutions 
negotiators can reach.  Both parties also had explicitly defined best 
                                            
50 These instructions were labeled Aconfidential@ and participants were specifically 
cautioned not to discuss their role instructions with anyone else. Thus, participants 
were not aware that some of them were instructed to conduct a telephone call and some 
were not. 
51 After the telephone call participants jotted down the date and time of the phone call, 
and how long the call lasted. After all negotiations had completed, participants engaged 
in classroom discussion of the results. These discussions confirmed that all phone calls 
were strictly social and were brief. 
52 See, e.g., Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14-15 (5th ed. 1998) (defining a 
Pareto-superior 53 This difference is statistically significant. See Table 1. 
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alternatives to a negotiated agreement (i.e., the value of the outside 
option they would take should they fail to come to an agreement in the 
negotiation). In case of such a negotiation impasse, each party would 
obtain 12,000 points, for a joint outcome of 24,000. 
 
B. THE RESULTS 
 
Small Talk negotiators who had a brief Agetting-to-know-you@ 
telephone conversation prior to negotiating via e-mail reached superior 
economic outcomes and markedly better social outcomes than 
negotiators who did not talk on the phone.  Differences between the 
Small Talk and No Small Talk conditions in economic and social 
outcomes are described below. 
 
1. Economic Outcomes - Small Talk Led to More Negotiated Agreements 
 
Small Talk negotiators were over four times as likely to reach an 
agreement as No Small Talk negotiators. Only three out of thirty-five 
Small Talk pairs (less than 9%) failed to reach an agreement, whereas 
fourteen out of thirty-seven No Small Talk pairs (nearly 40%) failed to 
reach agreement.53  The high percentage of No Small Talk pairs that 
were unable to reach agreement is especially noteworthy in light of the 
fact that a positive bargaining zone existed, making it economically 
desirable for each party to reach a negotiated agreement.54 
An examination of precisely what occurred between negotiators 
who reached impasse is revealing. Because parties negotiated via e-mail, 
the transcripts of unsuccessful negotiations indicate the last offer on the 
table prior to the point at which impasse was declared.55 For all three 
Small Talk negotiators that failed to reach agreement, the last offer on 
the table had a value below the reservation price of one of the parties. In 
other words, none (0%) of the Small Talk pairs walked away from an 
offer that was more profitable than their outside option. For all three 
pairs, given the value of the last offer, it is understandable that one of 
the parties would refuse to agree to it.  But the story for the No Small 
Talk pairs was quite different: the value of the last offer on the table 
exceeded both parties= reservation price for nine out of the fourteen 
pairs (64%).56  Thus, these eighteen negotiators (none of whom engaged 
                                            
54 When a positive bargaining zone exists, any deal is Pareto superior to no deal. See 
Korobkin, supra note 40, at 1816-17. 
55 Negotiators were given a strict deadline. Typically, negotiators did not declare 
impasse until time had run out. 
56 It is difficult to assess the statistical significance of the difference between rate of 
walking away from a profitable deal in the Small Talk (0%) and No Small Talk (64%) 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art30
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in small talk) failed to reach agreement despite the fact that the last 
available offer would have made all of them better off than impasse. 
The success of Small Talk negotiators cannot be explained by 
differences in motivation and ambition.  Talking to the other negotiator 
on the telephone did not result in Small Talk negotiators setting higher 
reservation prices or more ambitious aspirations for themselves as 
measured prior to the negotiation, compared to negotiators who did not 
engage in Small Talk.57  The striking superiority of negotiation outcomes 
where negotiators chatted briefly about personal matters on the 
telephone prior to talking business via e-mail must be attributable to 
other mechanisms, which I explore in the next section. 
                                                                                                                
conditions because the sample size of impassing pairs in the Small Talk group (N=3) is 
low. 
57 See Table 1.   
 
Table 1: 






































      





Impasse Rate** 8.6%  37.8%    
* p # .01 
** χ2(1) = 9.36; p < .01 
 
 
2. Social Outcomes 
 
a. Small Talk Led to a More Cooperative (and Less Competitive) 
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What accounts for the huge differences between the Small Talk 
and No Small Talk negotiators in their propensity to reach a mutually 
beneficial agreement? Prior to negotiating (but after the phone call, if 
there was one) negotiators indicated on a scale from one to seven (1 = 
Not at all; 7 = Quite a bit) how Acompetitive@ they were feeling toward 
their counterpart as they entered into the negotiation. Another question 
asked them to indicate how Acooperative@ they were feeling toward their 
counterpart. Negotiators who did not engage in small talk with their 
counterpart prior to negotiating reported feeling more competitive and 
less cooperative toward their counterpart than negotiators who did 
engage in small talk. These differences are illustrated in Table 2. 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art30
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Table 2 






































Cooperative** 4.77 1.06 3.88 1.06 3.57 
Competitive** 3.84 1.25 4.94 1.26 -3.70 
** p < .001 
 
 
b. Negotiation Processes 
 
Why would it be the case that negotiators who adopt more 
cooperative, less competitive attitudes toward the negotiation achieve 
greater success economically than negotiators who adopt the opposite 
attitudes?  After all, one might expect a negotiator who is too nice and 
not willing to be tough to do poorly in negotiation.  By contrast, in this 
simulation, the cooperative attitude adopted by negotiators who engaged 
in small talk led them to come away from the negotiation in a position 
that was substantially more favorable economically than those who did 
not engage in small talk. 
 
i. Small Talk Negotiators Shared More Information 
 
One possible reason for why more cooperative, less competitive 
attitudes were associated with more successful negotiations is that 
negotiators who engaged in Small Talk were better able to exchange the 
kind of information necessary to reach a mutually beneficial agreement. 
To test whether this process of mutual information exchange was 
actually occurring in the Small Talk condition, two coders examined the 
e-mail negotiation transcripts to identify information exchange 
processes.  The coders were blind to the experimental manipulation (i.e, 
that some negotiators had talked on the phone), and their rate of 
agreement with each other was within a conventionally acceptable 
range.58  The coders noted each instance that a party shared information 
about his or her own relative priorities for different issues (e.g., Athe 
                                            
58 Cohen=s Kappa = .74.  Cohen=s Kappa is a measure of inter-rater agreement. 
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radio is more important to me than the power extras@).  Consistent with 
their cooperative mental model of the negotiation process, negotiators 
who engaged in telephone small talk prior to negotiating exchanged 
significantly more information relating to their relative priorities on 
multiple issues compared to negotiators who did not engage in small 
talk.59  Thus, negotiators who established initial rapport with a brief 
telephone chat felt more cooperative in the negotiation and trusted the 
other negotiator enough to share the kind of information necessary to 
reach an efficient solution. 
 
ii. Small Talk Negotiators Engaged in More Reciprocity 
 
In addition to offering more freely their own information about 
relative priorities, information sharing was reciprocated more often for 
negotiators in the Small Talk condition than for negotiators in the No 
Small Talk condition.  That is, compared to negotiators who did not 
engage in small talk, negotiators who first chatted with their counterpart 
prior to negotiating were more likely to receive multiple issue priority 
information from their counterpart immediately following their own 
provision of such information.60  Negotiators who engaged in Small Talk 
expected more strongly to cooperate, did cooperate by sharing more 
relevant multiple-issue information, and received more cooperation in 
return from their counterpart.  This pattern of multiple-issue 
information sharing is precisely necessary for negotiators to recognize 
that there are numerous mutually beneficial solutions in the negotiation, 
and to avoid impasse.61 In this mixed motive negotiation, failing to 
exchange information resulted in negotiators failing to integrate their 
interests, leaving little or no joint surplus to share. 
 
iii. Small Talk Negotiators Made Fewer Threats 
 
The negotiation transcripts were also analyzed to examine 
whether negotiators provided information that related to one=s own 
alternative, because such a reference can be akin to a threat to walk away 
from the table (e.g., AI can buy a similarly equipped car much more 
                                            
59 Small Talk condition negotiators exchanged multiple issue information in 17.9% of 
their messages while No Small Talk condition negotiators did so in only 10.2% of their 
messages, a statistically significant difference.  χ2(1) = 12.53; p < .001.   
60 Small Talk condition negotiators engaged in immediate reciprocation of multiple 
issue information in 6.7% of their messages whereas No Small Talk condition 
negotiators did so in only 2.4% of their messages, a statistically significant difference.  
χ2(1) = 10.53; p < .001. 
61 See Raiffa, supra note 16; Lax & Sebenius, supra, note 37; Korobkin, supra note 40; 
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 38. 
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cheaply at another dealership@).  Compared to negotiators whose initial 
contact was strictly business-like, negotiators who engaged in small talk 
before negotiating were less likely to reference their own alternative.62 
Thus, in the absence of an initial getting-to-know-you telephone 
conversation, negotiators assumed a competitive mental model and 
behaved competitively during the negotiation by making subtle (or not 
so subtle) threats to walk away from the table.63 In sum, negotiators who 
did not engage in small talk both felt more competitive (as evidenced by 
their social perceptions prior to the negotiation described in Section 2a) 
and acted on these competitive inclinations by behaving more 
competitively in the negotiation. 
                                            
62 Small Talk condition negotiators referenced their Best Alternative to a Negotiated 
Agreement (BATNA) in only 12.3% of their messages whereas No Small Talk condition 
negotiators did so in 18.1% of their messages, a statistically significant difference.  χ2(1) 
= 6.5; p < .01. 
63 Given that there was a positive bargaining zone in this negotiation exercise, walking 
away from the table would have been an economically inferior outcome to reaching an 
agreement (within the bargaining zone). See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 40, at 1808-10. 
Recall that threats to walk away from the negotiation table in fact 
materialized for nearly 40% of the pairs whose members did not have 
the opportunity to engage in small talk, compared to only 9% of pairs 
who did chat before negotiating.  Table 3 illustrates a few representative 
excerpts from negotiations in both the Small Talk and No Small Talk 
conditions.  These quotations illustrate the extent to which negotiators 
who had an initial brief telephone conversation prior to negotiating 
continued to engage in small talk as part of the negotiation process itself. 
 By contrast, many of the negotiations that took place in the absence of 
an initial telephone chat were plagued with misunderstandings that 
negotiators attributed to the sinister motives of the other party. 
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Buyer: AThanks for your prompt responseY. Thanks for being such a 




Seller: AWell, deadline time is fast approaching, so I come to you now with 
what looks  like will be my last, full, and I feel is a fair offer. I pray you 
can take it, but otherwise, it was nice conducting business with you, and I 
hope we can still work together at some point in the futureY whatever 




Seller: AYsorry to hear that you haven=t been feeling well. Did you end up 
running the last leg of the marathon? Anyway, as I sit here watching the 
Duke-St. John=s game, contemplating your current offer, I have decided to 




Buyer: AFinally, I would like to thank you that we got this deal done so 
smoothly and quickly. Regarding the occasional misunderstandings which 
happened on both sides, I think this has to be attributed to the medium that 













Buyer: AI am surprised you are still getting back to me, especially if you do 
it only to complain about me and not to offer us an alternativeY. So far the 
only thing I have heard from you are assumptions, complaints and blaming 
us (your clients) for everything.  I am aware that you might have many 
clients, good for you, just remember that you are here selling something and 
the competition is furious so you should treat your clients better.  Otherwise 
there are some other options for us.@ 
Seller: AFrom your last e-mail, it sounds to me as if you believe I am trying 
to take advantage of you and am not taking you seriously.  Please let me 
assure you that is not the situation.@ 
Buyer: AOK now I think we at least are talking in the same language, I have 




Buyer: AUnfortunately there are some misunderstandings here. It seems 
that I did not make myself clear the way I should have. Therefore I shall try 
to clarify the situationY@ 
Seller: ALet=s not waste anymore time here.  My interests have not changed 
since the beginning of this negotiationY@ 
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c. Small Talk Negotiators Developed More Respect and Trust 
Negotiators who did not chat beforehand ended the negotiation 
with a substantially different attitude toward both the process and their 
counterpart than the negotiators who did chat initially.  These attitudes 
are illustrated in Table 4.64  Negotiators who did not chat found the 
process of e-mail communication more difficult, and ended up feeling 
significantly more angry, annoyed, and cold toward their opponent, as 
well as less friendly and pleasant, compared to negotiators who had the 
opportunity to chat with their opponent.  These feelings are consistent 
with the competitive mindset and inferior economic outcomes of 
negotiators in the No Small Talk condition.65  The increased cooperation 
and trust that the telephone chat engendered led to smoother 
interactions and a friendlier attitude toward the opponent after the 
negotiation concluded. 66 This attitude of cooperation and trust was also 
associated with respect B negotiators who engaged in small talk formed 
an impression of their counterpart as significantly more accomplished, 
skilled, effective, and perceptive than the impression formed by 
negotiators who did not engage in small talk, as illustrated in Table 4. 
Finally, this experiment also measured the extent to which 
negotiators came away trusting their counterparts. There are many 
conceptions and definitions of trust, but one way to define trust is the 
expectation that the other person will cooperate with you when you are 
in a vulnerable position.67 In legal communities, lawyers who face each 
other in one negotiation often can expect to cross paths again in the 
future.  If trust is eroded during negotiation in one matter, this is likely 
                                            
64 In the interests of brevity, this table omits certain measures in which no significant 
differences between groups were found. These results are available from the author 
upon request. 
65 Parties= feelings after a competitive, adversarial negotiation are important to consider 
because Aeven a >win= will be a loss if the other side is so beated down or regretful that it 
will resist complying with a negotiated agreement.@  Menkel-Meadow, supra note 38, at 
907. 
66 When a relationship between parties has been established, albeit the minor one 
formed in this experiment, the parties will likely take this relationship into account 
when negotiating and seek a solution both sides will consider just, resulting in a more 
positive attitude toward both the outcome and the negotiator.  See, e.g., Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 38, at 817.  Alternatively, without this relationship, parties may 
take a defensive posture and be more distrustful of the opposing side=s offers.  Id. at 
776-78 (labeling this type of behavior Aunproductive competition@).  This assumption 
that the opposing side=s offers are unfair explains why the negotiators in the No Small 
Talk condition would choose to walk away from the negotiation even though any deal 
would have been Pareto superior to no deal.  See Korobkin, supra note 40 and 
accompanying text. 
67 See, e.g., Denise M. Rousseau, Sim B. Sitkin, Ronald S. Burt, & Colin Camerer 
Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust, 23 Academy of 
Management 
Review 393, 395 (1998) (defining trust as Athe intention to accept vulnerability based 
upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.@) 
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to affect the way the lawyers approach the negotiation in the next matter 
when they meet again. To explore the question of whether engaging in 
Small Talk prior to negotiating would increase trust, negotiators in this 
experiment answered two questions relating to trust.  First, they were 
asked to suppose that they and their counterpart were in the position of 
working together on a future project and to rate how smoothly such a 
project would go (1 = Not at all; 7 = Very much so).  Second, negotiators 
were asked to imagine that sometime in the future, they were in a 
vulnerable position in a dispute with their counterpart=s firm.  Would 
they prefer to negotiate with the same counterpart, or some other 
unknown attorney (1 = Prefer unknown; 7 = Prefer same)?  Responses 
on these two items were highly correlated68 and were averaged to form a 
summary variable69 called Working Trust.  As Table 4 illustrates, 
negotiators who had an initial chat with their opponents left the 
negotiation with significantly more trust in their counterparts than did 
negotiators who did not chat initially.70 
                                            
68  r = .76; p < .01.  
69 α = .85 
70 Similarly, a survey of practicing lawyers found that problem-solving behavior during 
a negotiation was viewed as highly effective, whereas stubborn, arrogant, or unethical 
behavior was deemed ineffective, confirming the results of Gerald Williams=s parallel 
1976 study.  Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical 
Evidence on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 
143, 147 (2002). 
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Angry** 1.83 1.10 2.95 1.65 -3.36 
Annoyed** 2.76 1.48 4.22 1.93 -3.59 
Cold** 2.21 0.99 3.28 1.40 -3.72 
Friendly** 4.76 0.99 3.69 1.25 4.01 




     
Accomplished** 4.34 0.55 3.57 1.06 3.85 
Skilled** 4.51 0.75 3.65 1.15 3.76 
Effective** 4.60 0.77 3.73 1.23 3.45 
Perceptive** 4.39 0.88 3.58 1.23 3.19 
Communication      
Easy to Communicate** 4.70 1.26 3.45 1.67 3.57 
Working Trust* (α = .85) 5.17 1.19 4.36 1.53 2.49 
Smooth Future Project* 5.40 1.03 4.53 1.48 3.90 
Choose Same Partner + 4.94 1.53 4.20 1.77 1.89 
* p < .01 
** p < .001 




In the negotiation simulation involved in this experiment, a 
seemingly trivial intervention B a preliminary, brief, and informal chat 
on the telephone B increased the likelihood that the negotiations that 
followed would be characterized by cooperation, information exchange, 
reciprocity, liking, trust, and ultimately, agreement. These negotiators 
had the opportunity to establish common ground with the other 
negotiator through small talk, even if the basis for common ground was 
exceedingly trivial (e.g., AThe weather is nice here in Chicago.@  AYes, it is 
nice here, too.@).  Engaging in Small Talk enabled negotiators who were 
strangers to get to know one another and connect in a fashion that did 
not spontaneously occur during the process of e-mail exchange. The 
seemingly inert act of Small Talk encouraged negotiators to adopt a 
cooperative mental model in the negotiation, leading to the sharing 
crucial information with the other party. Negotiators who engaged in 
Small Talk took the chance that the other negotiator would reciprocate 
and share their own private information, which is precisely what 
happened.  The result was favorable impressions of the counterpart 
formed after the negotiation.  Negotiators who engaged in Small Talk 
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placed their trust in the ability of their counterpart to recognize the 
mutual benefit of information exchange.  When the counterpart 
successfully recognized these benefits and shared crucial information, 
their abilities and skills were respected, and they were generally held in 
high regard. 
By contrast, negotiators who did not have an opportunity to chat 
with their counterpart prior to e-mail negotiation approached the 
negotiation with a competitive mental model, and either failed to 
exchange the kind of information that would lead to identification of 
mutually beneficial solutions, or failed to recognize as beneficial the 
solutions which arose, leading to greater likelihood of impasse. In the 
absence of the phone call, the two negotiation counterparts were 
complete strangers, never having seen one another, or heard one 
another=s voice.  Because the other person was, in this sense, an 
unknown quantity, negotiators could not be sure of the other person=s 
motives. These circumstances were associated with negative impressions 
of the other person, as evidenced by negotiators= ratings of their 
opponents as less accomplished, skilled, effective, and perceptive than 
negotiators who engaged in Small Talk. In short, negotiators in the No 
Small Talk condition were less likely to reach agreement, which made 
them angry and annoyed and for which they blamed the other 
negotiator. By failing to reach agreement, pairs that impassed achieved 
an outcome that was economically worse than any of the myriad of 
possible agreements that would have resulted in a profitable outcome for 
each party. The failure to reach an economically advantageous outcome 
is even more remarkable when one considers the circumstances under 
which this occurred B a substantial portion of the No Small Talk 
negotiators who impassed did so despite an offer on the table that would 
have made both negotiators better off than impasse. 
One reason that a cooperative mental model served negotiators 
well in this simulation (while an overly competitive mental model served 
negotiators poorly) is that cooperation helped participants solve the 
negotiators= dilemma.71  This getting-to-know-you telephone call made 
                                            
71 See note 37 and accompanying text.  Menkel-Meadow has argued that a collaborative 
approach to negotiation facilitates the sharing of information by encouraging 
negotiators to unearth each party=s underlying needs, rather than simply assuming the 
parties= interests are in direct opposition to each other.  Menkel-Meadow, supra note 
38, at 801-09.  See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn=t Everything: The 
Lawyer as Problem Solver, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 916 (2000) (advocating that 
negotiators begin analyzing a dispute by answering the basic journalism questions of 
who, what, why, when, where, and how); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, AHA? Is Creativity 
Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in Legal Education?, 6 HARV. 
NEGOTIATION L. REV. 97, 109-11 (2001) (emphasizing the importance of creativity in 
legal problem solving).    
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e-mail interaction proceed more smoothly by creating rapport before the 
negotiation began.  This rapport helped negotiators approach the 
negotiation with a more cooperative mental model, thereby trusting in 
each others= good intentions.72 This mental model, in turn, led to a 
successful negotiation that concluded with a contract and engendered 
positive feelings about one another. The negotiators who engaged in 
small talk solved the negotiators= dilemma by agreeing (albeit tacitly) to 
share enough information to determine what kind of agreement would 
satisfy their needs simultaneously.  Sharing information was crucial in 
the negotiation simulation used in this experiment because of the mixed 
motive nature of the exercise.  While some issues were purely 
distributive, others were could be profitably logrolled in a manner that 
inured to the benefit of both parties simultaneously.  To successfully 
expand the pie of available resources (as opposed to simply 
compromising and Asplitting the difference@), it was crucial for 
negotiators in this experiment to exchange enough information to allow 
them to determine, for example, that both parties preferred all airbags 
and yellow color, that financing was an especially important issue for the 
seller, but warranty was especially important for the buyer, etc.  Without 
communicating this information in some form, negotiators were unable 
to maximize the joint value of the agreement.  Adopting an attitude that 
was more cooperative than competitive allowed negotiators to trust the 
other party enough to share with them relevant private information, and 
to expect the other party to reciprocate by sharing their own relevant 
private information, which in turn resulted in identification of and 
agreement to efficient solutions.73 Because lawyers are repeat players 
                                            
72 In addition to increased trust in the other party=s intentions during the experiment, 
the cooperative mental model of the negotiators in the Small Talk condition may have 
been shaped by reputational concerns.  Although the negotiators in each dyad attended 
different law schools, they were undoubtedly aware that there was a chance (albeit 
small) that they would both end up practicing law in the same city, or even at the same 
law firm.  It is possible that they had some concern about the potential for future 
interaction, and this concern was undoubtedly highlighted when negotiators had a 
telephone call which had the express purpose of getting to know the other person.  As in 
the Latane & Darley study on helping, supra note 43, negotiators who engaged in Small 
Talk may have adopted a more cooperative negotiation strategy to guard against 
awkward future interactions.  See Gilson, supra note 38, at 521 (arguing  that the 
prospect of future dealings fosters cooperative behavior on the part of litigators, 
analogous to a prisoner=s dilemma in which participants know that a high probability of 
future rounds exists, due to the mutual benefits derived from establishing a cooperative 
reputation); Cohen, supra note 48, at 797 (arguing that a reputation for fairness is a 
valuable asset, providing a strong incentive to act ethically while negotiating). 
73 Menkel-Meadow argues that the adversarial approach to negotiation limits the 
amount and type of information that will be shared because the discussion will proceed 
in a debate-like (attack and defend) format, rather than an open discussion where each 
side proceeds in an information-seeking manner.  Menkel-Meadow, supra note 38, at 
776-78.  As a result, negotiators will fail to discover the full range of issues involved and 
the value each party assigns to those issues, thereby restricting the range of possible 
solutions and leaving needs unmet.  Id. at 793.  See also Mendelsohn, supra note 33, at 
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within a legal community, and often expect to interact again in the 
future,74 it is important to observe here that one deal that sours because 
of misunderstandings in the course of e-mail negotiations can affect the 
tenor of future negotiations B whether conducted via e-mail or more 
traditional means. 
 
IV. E-MAIL NEGOTIATION: OBSTACLES AND SOLUTIONS 
Often in negotiation, reaching an agreement may be difficult 
because it is unclear whether a mutually beneficial solution is possible; 
negotiators must exchange enough information to ascertain that a 
positive bargaining zone exists.  If negotiators perceive little basis to 
trust the other party, they are unlikely to successfully exchange the 
information necessary to reach an agreement. 
E-mail negotiations are, by nature, impersonal in the sense that 
non-verbal behavioral expressions, such as laughter, smiles, head nods, 
shoulder shrugs, yawns, and facial expressions, cannot easily be 
perceived.  As a result, e-mail negotiations are often strained and 
awkward.  It is perhaps not surprising, then, that many of the 
participants in this study were unable to reach a negotiated agreement. 
At the same time, the likelihood of impasse was reduced when 
participants performed a very simple preliminary act -- they had a short 
telephone conversation whose sole purpose was to get to know the other 
person.  The simple act of chatting and exchanging personal information 
helped to build rapport and overcome some of the communication 
difficulties associated with the impoverished medium of e-mail.  As a 
result, negotiators= attitudes toward their opponents changed; 
negotiators who had chatted with their opponent felt less competitive 
and more cooperative before the negotiation began than did negotiators 
who had not chatted with their opponent.  In the end, negotiators who 
had made personal contact with their opponent felt more confident that 
future interaction with the same person would go smoothly. Thus, a 
relationship of trust was developed through the building of rapport via 
the personalizing phone call prior to the negotiation.  By contrast, 
negotiators who did not initially chat had a good chance of ending up 
without a deal, and left the virtual negotiating table feeling angry and 
resentful about the entire process. 
This study documents the importance for lawyers of establishing 
rapport when negotiating over e-mail with another lawyer who is an 
Aunknown quanitity.@  When face-to-face contact between negotiators is 
                                                                                                                
146 (stating that Aa competitive mindset effectively chills creativity by discouraging the 
framing of negotiations as joint problem-solving sessions@); supra note 40 and 
accompanying text.     
74 See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 38. 
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not possible, it is important to find an alternative method of building 
rapport.  This study demonstrates that a social, personalizing 
communication via telephone is one way to restore some rapport that 
may be missing from electronically mediated negotiations. 
Even if it is not possible for lawyers engaged in negotiations to 
connect via telephone, there are many other ways to establish rapport 
and an attitude of cooperation prior to negotiating.  Even having an 
initial, non-business, getting-to-know-you chat over e-mail prior to 
beginning e-mail negotiations has been shown to increase the likelihood 
of reaching a mutually beneficial agreement.75  Moreover, outside of the 
negotiation context, social psychologists have shown that using flattery 
(even when people suspect the flatterer has ulterior motives) and humor, 
and mentioning points of similarity, can facilitate good feelings and 
relationship building, thereby engendering the kind of cooperation and 




                                            
75 See Moore, et al., supra note 42. 
76 See, e.g., LEIGH THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 36 (1998). 
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